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NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-WAIVER OF APPELLATE REVIEW OF
DEATH SENTENCES IN ARKANSAS.
STANDING-CAPACITY TO LITIGATE MATTERS OF PUBLIC IN-
TEREST IN ARKANSAS. Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181, 754 S.W.2d 839
(1988).
On December 28, 1987, Ronald Gene Simmons killed two per-
sons and wounded four others during a shooting spree in Russellville,
Arkansas. Later, investigators found the bodies of fourteen members
of the Simmons' family at his rural home. Investigators speculated
that Simmons killed those living in the household while they slept and
that he killed the others as they arrived for the Christmas holidays.'
On May 16, 1988, a jury convicted Simmons for the two murders
in Russellville and sentenced him to death.2 As soon as the court
announced the sentence, Simmons took the stand and testified that he
would not appeal the sentence. Consequently, the trial court con-
ducted a hearing to determine whether Simmons was competent to
waive his right to appeal the sentence. After finding that he made the
decision knowingly and intelligently, the court held that Simmons
was competent to waive his right to appeal and set an execution date.
As the execution date neared and Simmons continued to refuse
to appeal the sentence, Reverend Louis Franz, a Catholic priest who
counsels inmates at the Arkansas Department of Corrections, filed a
motion in the trial court asking that he be allowed to intervene and
that the court stay the execution. The court found Simmons compe-
tent to act for himself, and denied Franz's motion to intervene. Franz
then petitioned the Arkansas Supreme Court to stay the execution
and to require at least one appellate review for all death sentences.
Franz asserted standing as "next friend" 3 to Simmons and as a tax-
1. Arkansas Gazette, Dec. 30, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
2. The jury also convicted Simmons of five counts of attempted murder and one count of
kidnapping. He was sentenced to 147 years in prison for these convictions. Arkansas Gazette,
May 17, 1988, at 6, col. 2.
3. A next friend acts for the benefit of a party who lacks the capacity to assert his own
legal rights. Next friend standing is commonly asserted where the rights of infants or mentally
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payer.4 He also alleged that the court, by placing form over substance
and denying him standing, would leave important constitutional ques-
tions unresolved at the appellate level.
The Arkansas Supreme Court denied Franz standing on each ba-
sis. However, the court cited the "uniqueness and irreversibility" of
the death penalty and proceeded to clarify Arkansas law regarding a
capital defendant's right to waive appellate review of a death sen-
tence.5 The majority held that neither Arkansas law nor the United
States Constitution requires review of all death sentences. However,
the defendant may waive the appeal process "only if he has been judi-
cially determined to have the capacity to understand the choice be-
tween life and death and to knowingly and intelligently waive any and
all rights to appeal his sentence."' 6 The court also held that it will
review the trial court's determination that the defendant possesses the
requisite competency anytime a defendant waives the right to appeal a
death sentence. After reviewing the trial court's determination of
Simmons' competency, the court affirmed that Simmons was compe-
tent to waive the right to appeal the sentence.7 Franz v. State, 296
Ark. 181, 754 S.W.2d 839 (1988).
MANDATORY APPELLATE REVIEW
The term "mandatory appeal" refers to appellate review which is
initiated automatically upon entry of a death sentence and which the
defendant may not waive.8 Courts and commentators tend to use this
incompetent persons are involved. Kaine, Capital Punishment and The Waiver of Sentence
Review, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483, 489 n.23 (1983).
4. ARK. CONST. art. XVI, § 13 provides that "[a]ny citizen of any county, city or town
may institute suit in behalf of himself and all others interested, to protect the inhabitants
thereof against the enforcement of any illegal exactions whatever." See infra notes 182-88 and
accompanying text.
5. Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181, 186, 754 S.W.2d 839, 842 (1988).
6. Id. at 189, 754 S.W.2d at 843.
7. Rev. Franz and Darrel Wayne Hill, a death row inmate, subsequently petitioned the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas for a writ of habeas corpus to
prevent Simmons' execution. The petition claimed that Arkansas' failure to provide
mandatory appellate review of all death sentences violated the eighth amendment. The district
court held that the petitioners lacked standing under traditional standards, but it examined the
mandatory appeal claim to determine whether some aspect of mandatory appeal created a
special interest sufficient to warrant standing. The court determined that at least one appellate
review of every death sentence is constitutionally mandated, but the claim was not sufficient to
grant standing to Franz or Hill. However, the court held that it had to make an independent
determination of Simmons' competence to waive his federal habeas corpus right, so it ordered
that Simmons undergo further psychological evaluation, which is still pending. Franz v. Lock-
hart, No. PB-B-88-444 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 23, 1988) (WESTLAW, Database: DCT).
8. Franz v. Lockhart, No. PB-B-88-444 at 12.
MANDATORY APPELLATE REVIEW
term interchangeably with the term "automatic appeal." 9 An auto-
matic appeal also refers to appellate review which is initiated auto-
matically upon entry of the sentence. With automatic appeal,
however, the defendant may waive review. 0 All states which recog-
nize the death penalty provide automatic appeal of the sentence, and
most of these states do not allow the defendant to waive review."
The "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the eighth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution 12 controls imposition of the
death sentence. 13 United States Supreme Court interpretations of the
clause as it relates to the death penalty establish three tests which
must be met for a capital sentencing statute to pass constitutional
scrutiny. First, the procedure must not allow imposition of the sen-
tence in a manner that violates contemporary standards of decency.
14
Second, the procedure must provide safeguards to protect against ar-
bitrary or capricious imposition of the sentence.1 5 Finally, the proce-
dure must allow the sentencing body to determine the appropriateness
of the sentence as applied to each individual defendant.16
The first test reflects traditional eighth amendment analysis.
1 7
The scope of the amendment changes as the standards of society
change; thus, the attitudes of contemporary society determine the
scope of the amendment. 18 As a result, resolution of questions con-
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44 (1984) ("All of the new statutes provide for
automatic appeal of death sentences."). See also U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics, Bull., Capital Punishment 1986 (Sept. 1987) (stating that only Arkansas, Florida, Ohio,
and Vermont had no specific provision for automatic review). The following eighteen states
specifically provide for automatic appellate review of all capital convictions: ALA. CODE
§ 13A-5-53 (1982); 17 A.R.S. RULES OF CRIM. PROC., Rule 31.2 (Arizona); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1239(b) (West 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(g) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(4) (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2827 (1987);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(i) (1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(h) (Burns 1985 &
Supp. 1988); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.9 (West 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 414 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2525 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI) (1986);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.13 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §
971 1(h) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE § 18-9-20 (1976); VA. CODE ANN. § 17-110.1 (1988); Wyo.
STAT. § 6-2-103 (1977).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
13. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
14. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
15. Id. at 188.
16. Id. at 189-92.
17. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
18. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) ("The [cruel and unusual punishment]
clause of the Constitution in the opinion of the learned commentators may be therefore pro-
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cerning the amendment involves determination of contemporary stan-
dards regarding the infliction of punishment.' 9 To ascertain these
public standards, courts consider legislative attitudes and the deci-
sions of juries.2"
The other two tests arise from the United States Supreme Court's
application of the "contemporary standards of decency test" to death
penalty cases. In Furman v. Georgia 21 the Court held that the death
penalty statutes of three states constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the eighth amendment. 22 Each justice filed a sep-
arate opinion expressing a somewhat different view, but the possibility
of arbitrary or capricious administration of the sentence underscored
the opinions of three justices.23 The justices attributed these short-
comings to the standardless discretion vested in trial judges and ju-
ries.24 These separate opinions form the key ideas for later Supreme
Court decisions clarifying the constitutional requirements for imposi-
tion of the sentence.
The variety of opinions in Furman created confusion as to the
requirements of a constitutional death penalty statute.25 Neverthe-
less, states recognizing the death penalty rushed to redraft their laws
in an attempt to comply with the mandate of Furman.26 The Court
reviewed the first of these post-Furman statutes and clarified the con-
stitutional requirements in five landmark cases decided on the same
date in 1976.27 The Court upheld three of these statutes because they
provided standards which minimized the possibility of arbitrary or
gressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion be-
comes enlightened by a humane justice."). Id. at 378.
19. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion) ("The amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."). Id. at 101.
20. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2691 (1988).
21. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
22. Id. at 240.
23. Justice Douglas noted that the states imposed the penalty in an inconsistent and dis-
criminatory manner. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Stewart felt that the
statutes allowed the penalty to be imposed "wantonly and freakishly." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Justice White challenged the statutes because the states infrequently imposed the
sentence and because the statutes did not provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing cases
which imposed the penalty from cases which did not impose the penalty. Id. at 313 (White, J.,
concurring).
24. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-95. See also Pulley, 465 U.S. at 44.
25. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 599 (1978).
26. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 44.
27. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (hereinafter the 1976 cases).
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capricious results by limiting the discretion of trial judges and juries.28
The Court struck down the other two statutes because they made the
death penalty mandatory for certain crimes with no consideration of
the individual circumstances of each case.29
In each of these cases and in subsequent cases, the Court stressed
the importance of appellate review as a safeguard against arbitrary or
capricious results.3 0  In Gregg v. Georgia3 1 the Court indicated that
states should provide "meaningful appellate review" to insure consis-
tent imposition of death sentences.32 The Court emphasized that the
requirement for mandatory review of each death sentence created "an
important additional safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice."33
In Proffitt v. Floridaa4 and Jurek v. Texas 35 the Court also indicated
that automatic appellate review of every death sentence affords an im-
portant check on the discretion of the sentencer. In 1982 the Court
reaffirmed the importance of appellate review in Zant v. Stephens. 6
The Zant Court stated that its decision to uphold the challenged
death penalty statute depended "in part on the existence of an impor-
tant procedural safeguard, the mandatory appellate review of each
death sentence .... ,"I In 1984 the Court in Pulley v. Harrisa8 noted
that previous decisions relied on the presence of automatic review in
upholding capital sentencing schemes.3 9 The Court also noted that
the joint opinion in Gregg "suggested that some form of meaningful
appellate review is required."'
While these decisions indicate the importance of appellate re-
view, no decision directly addresses the ability of the defendant to
waive this review. A criminal defendant may waive constitutional
28. The Court upheld the statutes in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek See Pulley, 465 U.S. at
44-45.
29. The Court struck down the statutes in Woodson and Roberts. See Pulley, 465 U.S. at
44-45.
30. See, e.g., Pulley, 465 U.S. at 45.
31. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
32. Id. at 195. See Kaine, supra note 3, at 484.
33. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198. "An important aspect of the new Georgia legislative scheme,
however, is its provision for appellate review. Prompt review by the Georgia Supreme Court is
provided for in every case in which the death penalty is imposed." Id. at 211 (White, J., joined
by Rehnquist, J., concurring).
34. 428 U.S. 242, 250-53 (1976).
35. 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976).
36. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
37. Id. at 890.
38. 465 U.S. 37, 44 (1984).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 45. However, the Pulley Court held that appellate review need not include a
comparison of the case before the court with sentences imposed in similar cases.
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rights which are personal to himself.4 In Johnson v. Zerbst42 the
Court defined such waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right or privilege."43 Further, the defendant
must be competent to comprehend these rights and to intelligently
waive them.44
On the other hand, the defendant may not waive rights where the
right or privilege benefits society as a whole as well as the defendant.4 5
In such cases, the interest of society overrides the personal interest of
the defendant. For example, a defendant may not waive his right to a
jury trial without the consent of the prosecuting attorney due to soci-
ety's interest in the integrity of the criminal justice system.46 This
same interest in the criminal justice system prevents a defendant from
waiving the sixth amendment right to confront witnesses and de-
manding that the state present its case without witnesses.47 Likewise,
the defendant may not waive his right to a speedy trial and ask to be
tried three years later after the memories of witnesses have faded. 8
Finally, the public's first amendment right to receive information
about the criminal justice system prevents a defendant from waiving
the right to a public trial.49
Waiver of rights by capital defendants receives special attention.
Because of society's interest in the fair and just imposition of the
death sentence, capital defendants may not waive rights which are
waivable in other criminal cases.5 0 A capital defendant may not
waive the right to be present at trial and sentencing."' In addition, the
capital defendant may not waive the right to counsel or the right to
abandon post-judgment appeals of his sentence52 without an in-
41. A person may waive his fourth amendment protection against warrantless searches,
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and the sixth amendment right to
counsel. See Kaine, supra note 3, at 499-504.
42. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
43. Id. at 464.
44. Id.
45. Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 383 A.2d 174 (1978) (defendant may not
waive mandatory appellate review of death sentence).
46. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
47. Id.
48. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
49. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
50. Kaine, supra note 3, at 506.
51. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
52. Although defendants have not been successful in avoiding the minimum appeal where
appeal is mandatory, they have been able to forego further assertion of their rights upon a
showing that they are competent to make the decision. See Strafer, Volunteering for Execu-
tion: Competency, Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 860 (1983).
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dependent judicial determination of his competence to make such a
decision knowingly and intelligently.53
In Rees v. Peyton 54 the Court set forth the standard used to de-
termine the defendant's competence to abandon post-judgment chal-
lenges to his sentence. 55 In such cases, a court must determine that
the defendant possesses the "capacity to appreciate his position and
make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning fur-
ther litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a
mental disease, disorder, or defect ... ."56 If the defendant lacks the
competence to make a knowing and intelligent waiver, the court may
appoint a next friend to assert the defendant's rights.57
A next friend asserts the rights of another person who is unable
to assert his own rights .5  Early common law recognized next friend
petitions to prevent a person from suffering loss of liberty or life.59
The English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 expressly authorized next
friend petitions.' In the United States, federal law incorporates the
next friend concept by allowing applications to be filed on behalf of an
inmate. 61 By statute, Arkansas allows next friends to file writs of
habeas corpus on behalf of infants.62
Interested parties frequently attempt to gain next friend standing
when a defendant refuses to appeal a death sentence.63 In these cases,
the next friend must demonstrate that a sufficient relationship exists
between himself and the defendant.' The cases do not clearly define
the necessary relationship, but the courts tend to distinguish persons
with a genuine and legitimate interest in the defendant from "intrud-
ers and uninvited meddlers. ' ' 65 Under this standard, courts routinely
accept close relatives and former attorneys, but members of the public
53. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966) (per curiam).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 314.
56. Id.
57. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 58-70.
58. See generally Kaine, supra note 3, at 489.
59. Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32
STAN. L. REV. 765, 799 (1980). See United States ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916
(2d Cir. 1921).
60. The English Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, ch. 2. The Act codified English
common law regarding the issuance of the writ. See Note, supra note 59, at 799 n. 135.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1971).
62. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-103 (1987). The statute also grants next friend standing
to represent the rights of married women, but ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-502 (1987) removes
the disability of married women and renders this section obsolete.
63. Kaine, supra note 3, at 489.
64. Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Strafer, supra note 52, at 909.
65. United States v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1921).
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in general are denied.66
Even if the next friend demonstrates a sufficient relationship, the
court must also find that the defendant lacks the capability to act in
his own behalf.67 Courts grant next friend standing to allow persons
to act for infants and for inmates who lack sufficient time to act for
themselves.68 They also allow next friends to act for defendants who
lack the mental capacity to act for themselves.69 In the case of capital
defendants who refuse to pursue habeas corpus relief, courts grant
next friend standing only if the defendant is incompetent to waive his
right.7 °
In Gilmore v. Utah71 the United States Supreme Court applied
the waiver doctrine to allow a defendant sentenced to death to waive
appeal even though no appellate court had reviewed the sentence.72 A
Utah trial court convicted Gary Gilmore of murder and sentenced
him to death.73 Gilmore refused to appeal the sentence, and the Utah
Supreme Court found him competent to waive his right.74 Asserting
standing as his next friend, Gilmore's mother petitioned the United
States Supreme Court to stay the execution and to consider the consti-
tutionality of Utah's death penalty statute.75 After reviewing the
Utah court's competency determination, the Supreme Court affirmed
that Gilmore "made a knowing and intelligent waiver of any and all
federal rights he might have asserted after the Utah trial court's sen-
tence was imposed ... 76 Since Gilmore was competent to act on
his own behalf, his mother lacked standing to question the constitu-
tionality of Utah's law, and the question remained unresolved.77
In dissent, four justices questioned Gary Gilmore's ability to
waive appellate court review. Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall
contended "that the consent of a convicted defendant in a criminal
case does not privilege a State to impose a punishment otherwise for-
66. See Strafer, supra note 52, at 909 n.21 1. See also Davis v. Austin, 492 F. Supp. 273,
275 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
67. Strafer, supra note 52, at 909.
68. See United States ex rel. Funaro v. Watchorn, 164 F. 152 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908). See
also Evans v. Bennett, 467 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D. Ala. 1979).
69. Evans, 467 F. Supp. at 1110.
70. Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1976).
71. 429 U.S. at 1012.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1015.
75. Id. at 1013.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1017.
576 [Vol. 11:569
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bidden by the Eighth Amendment. ' 78 Likewise, Justice Marshall, in
a separate opinion, expressed the belief "that the Eighth Amendment
not only protects the right of individuals not to be victims of cruel and
unusual punishment, but that it also expresses a fundamental interest
of society in ensuring that state authority is not used to administer
barbaric punishments. ' 79 Finally, Justice Blackmun stated that "the
question of Bessie Gilmore's standing and the constitutional issue are
not insubstantial .... ,,8o Thus, he contended that the Court should
give the matter "plenary, not summary consideration," notwithstand-
ing Gilmore's waiver. 8' Nevertheless, the plurality held that
"whatever may be said as to the merits of [the waiver issue,] the ques-
tion simply is not before us."82
Like other states, Arkansas also rewrote its capital sentencing
statute in the wake of Furman-3 The new statute limited imposition
of the sentence to crimes meeting the statutory definition of capital
felony murder.84 It also provided for a bifurcated trial with separate
guilt determination and sentencing proceedings. 85 To guide the dis-
cretion of sentencers, the new scheme listed aggravating 86 and miti-
gating 87 circumstances for the jury to consider. After returning a
guilty verdict, the jury must consider these circumstances and answer
three questions affirmatively before imposing the death sentence.
88
78. Id. at 1018 (White, J., joined by Brennan, and Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1020 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1017 (Burger, C.J., joined by Powell, J., concurring).
83. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-601 to -617 (1987) (formerly ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-4701
to 4713 (Cum. Supp. 1973)).
84. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-601 to -617 (1987).
85. Id. § 5-4-602.
86. Id. § 5-4-604. These aggravating circumstances include commission of the crime by a
person already imprisoned for a felony, commission of the crime by a person unlawfully at
liberty after being convicted of a felony, previous conviction for a felony involving the use or
threat of violence, commission of the capital murder knowing that a person other than the
victim is placed at risk, commission of the capital murder for the purpose of avoiding arrest or
escaping from custody, commission of capital murder for pecuniary gain, commission of capi-
tal murder for the purpose of disrupting or hindering governmental or political processes, or
commission of the capital murder in "an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner." Id.
87. Id. § 5-4-605. These mitigating circumstances include commission of the capital mur-
der while the defendant was experiencing extreme mental or emotional disturbance, commis-
sion of the crime while the defendant acted under unusual pressures or influences or under the
domination of another person, commission of the crime while the defendant lacked the capac-
ity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct due to mental disease or defect, intoxication,
or drug abuse, commission of the crime by a youth, or commission of the crime by one with no
significant prior criminal history.
88. Id. § 5-4-603.
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First, the jury must find that one of the aggravating circumstances
accompanied the offense. 89 Then, it must find that the aggravating
circumstance outweighs any mitigating circumstances, 90 including but
not limited to those listed.9' Finally, the jury must find that the ag-
gravating circumstances justify the death sentence beyond a reason-
able doubt.92 If the jury answers negatively to any question, the court
imposes a sentence of life in prison without parole instead of the death
sentence.
93
A capital defendant first challenged the constitutionality of Ar-
kansas' new statute in Collins v. State.94 Convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to death, Alfred Collins appealed his sentence to the
Arkansas Supreme Court. The court affirmed the conviction and held
that the new Arkansas sentencing scheme complied with the constitu-
tional mandate of Furman.95 Collins then petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for certiorari. The Court granted Collins' writ,
vacated the judgment, and remanded the case back to the Arkansas
Supreme Court to reconsider in light of the 1976 cases decided after
the Arkansas Supreme Court's initial review. 96 On remand, the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court found that the new Arkansas procedure "pro-
vides adequate safeguards against arbitrary, capricious or freakish
imposition of the death penalty to successfully pass constitutional ex-
amination in the light of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
standards ascertainable from the Woodson-Roberts-Gregg-Proffitt-
Jurek quintuplet offspring of Furman.97
In the later Collins opinion, the Arkansas Supreme Court con-
ceded that the Arkansas procedure did not provide for mandatory
appellate review of death sentences,98 but the majority held that its
absence did not render the procedure unconstitutional. 99 Although
the court acknowledged that appellate review is an important safe-
guard, the majority held that the 1976 cases only require that "a
meaningful appellate review is available to insure that death penalties
89. Id. § 5-4-603(a)(1).
90. Id. § 5-4-603(a)(2).
91. Id. § 5-4-605.
92. Id. § 5-4-603(a)(3).
93. Id. § 5-4-603(c).
94. 259 Ark. 8, 531 S.W.2d 13, vacated, 429 U.S. 808 (1976).
95. Collins, 259 Ark. at 12-13, 531 S.W.2d at 15.
96. 429 U.S. 808 (1976).
97. Collins v. State, 261 Ark. 195, 219, 548 S.W.2d 106, 119-20 (1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 878 (1977).
98. Collins, 261 Ark. at 211, 548 S.W.2d at 115.
99. Id. at 205, 548 S.W.2d at 112.
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are not arbitrarily, capriciously, or freakishly imposed."'l° The court
stated that the idea of required mandatory review of all death penal-
ties "crumbled with the . . . actions of the court in Gilmore v.
Utah.' °10 1 "If the Constitution of the United States requires that a
state provide a mandatory appeal," the Arkansas Supreme Court
could "not see how there can be a knowing and intelligent waiver of
'any and all federal rights' when there has been no appeal from the
state trial court's judgment imposing the death sentence." 102
In Franz v. State0 3 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that
neither the United States Constitution nor Arkansas law mandates
review of all death sentences. Quoting Collins"° extensively, the
court reaffirmed that there "is no mandatory appellate review in Ar-
kansas"' 5 and that the lack of mandatory review does not render the
law unconstitutional. 10 6 The court also dismissed the contention that
a statutory requirement that the "Supreme Court shall review all er-
rors prejudicial to the rights of the appellant" in all capital cases man-
dates review of all capital cases."0 7 The court held that these
provisions "simply mean that this Court must make its own examina-
tion of the record when an appeal is taken in such cases; they do not
mandate an appeal."'' 0
In regard to waiver, the court held that it would not "automati-
cally acquiesce" in the defendant's decision not to appeal.' 9 In a pre-
vious case, the court held that a capital defendant must knowingly
and intelligently decide to waive his right to further appeals of his
sentence before waiver will be allowed;110 however, the court did not
enunciate a clear standard to apply in such cases.11" ' In Franz the
court noted that the federal standard, as enunciated in Rees," 2 for
determining whether a defendant competently waived his rights is
roughly equivalent to the standard applied to determine a defendant's
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 206, 548 S.W.2d at 112.
103. 296 Ark. 181, 754 S.W.2d 839 (1988).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 94-102.
105. 296 Ark. at 186, 754 S.W.2d at 842 (quoting Collins v. State, 261 Ark. 195, 211, 548
S.W.2d 106, 115 (1977)).




110. Remeta v. State, 294 Ark. 206, 740 S.W.2d 928 (1987).
111. Franz v. State, 296 Ark. at 188, 754 S.W.2d at 843.
112. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966).
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competence to stand trial.1 3 The court observed that competence to
stand trial and competence to waive challenges to a death sentence are
distinctly different. "1 4 In the latter instance, the defendant must have
the capacity to understand the choice between life and death." 5 As a
result, the court articulated a higher standard for application to
waiver cases in Arkansas. To waive appellate review in Arkansas, the
defendant must possess the capacity to understand the difference be-
tween life and death and to knowingly and intelligently waive any and
all rights to appeal his sentence.
1 6
In dissent, Justice Glaze contended that "Arkansas's [sic] present
procedure is ... constitutionally suspect" and insisted that the "court
could avoid those constitutional questions and potential pitfalls by re-
viewing the sentence phase of death penalty cases.""' 7 He asserted
that no United States Supreme Court decision resolves the question of
whether a capital defendant may waive state appellate review." 8 In
Gilmore the Supreme Court dealt solely with Bessie Gilmore's stand-
ing, and the Court's decision relied solely on Gary Gilmore's compe-
tence to act for himself.' 'I Other than an implicit requirement that an
appellate court must review the competency proceeding, Justice Glaze
asserted that "little more can be gleaned from the Gilmore deci-
sion. '"110 Moreover, Justice Glaze observed that the special require-
ments and great scrutiny which the United States Constitution and
Arkansas law require cannot be consistently measured without review
of all capital sentences.' 2 1 He also observed that the court's holding
results in Arkansas being the only state that does not review all death
sentences. 
22
In addition to avoiding these constitutional problems, Justice
Glaze contended that mandatory review expedites disposal of capital
cases.' 23 He noted that defendants who initially waive their right to
appeal tend to subsequently change their minds and decide to appeal.
113. A defendant is competent to stand trial if he "understands the charges against him
and has the capacity to communicate with his attorney." Franz, 296 Ark. at 189, 754 S.W.2d




117. Id. at 198, 754 S.W.2d at 848 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 195, 754 S.W.2d at 847.
119. Id. at 196, 754 S.W.2d at 847.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 195-97, 754 S.W.2d at 847-48.
122. Id. at 196, 754 S.W.2d at 847.
123. Id. at 198, 754 S.W.2d at 848.
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This results in extensions and delays in carrying out the sentence. 124
By reviewing all sentences as a matter of procedure, Justice Glaze
contended that the court could minimize such delays. 25 He insisted
that the court, not a criminal defendant, should control the state's
criminal policy; thus, "no criminal defendant, including Simmons in
this cause, should dictate this state's policy concerning whether death
sentences should be reviewed."' 26
Also dissenting, Justice Hays argued that the court should adopt
a rule requiring review of all death sentences. 127 Noting the societal
interest in fair administration of the penalty, he contended that appel-
late review is a basic step in a death sentencing procedure. 2 To illus-
trate the relationship of mandatory appeal to this procedure, he
observed that a defendant cannot "by-pass a trial or, if a plea of guilty
is entered, a hearing on the guilty plea."' 129 Just as these procedures
are basic to our criminal justice system and cannot be avoided by the
defendant, appellate review of death sentences is basic to a capital
sentencing scheme and cannot be by-passed by the defendant. 130 Jus-
tice Hays also contended that nothing prevented the court from
adopting such a rule, for the discussion of mandatory appeal in Col-
lins was dictum and not binding on the court.' 3 ' The court could
adopt a requirement for mandatory review of all cases under the
court's rule-making power. 132 He concluded that by "rejecting the
opportunity to adopt a rule of mandatory review the majority has put
Arkansas at odds with all but one of the thirty-seven states which
have the death penalty, not an enviable position, and not one likely to
endure."1
33
Clearly, the court's decision establishes the procedure that Ar-
kansas courts will follow anytime a capital defendant waives the right
to appeal a death sentence. The procedure includes mandatory appel-
late review of the trial court's determination that the defendant pos-
124. Id. As an example, convicted murderer Michael O'Rourke decided after his initial
appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court to forego his right to further appeal his sentence. He
was scheduled to be executed on May 18, 1988, but on May 16, 1988, he changed his mind.
His execution has been stayed until his federal appeals are exhausted. Arkansas Gazette, May
17, 1988, at 6, col. 5.
125. 296 Ark. at 198, 754 S.W.2d at 848.
126. Id. at 197-98, 754 S.W.2d at 848.
127. Id. at 199, 754 S.W.2d at 849 (Hays, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 200, 754 S.W.2d at 849.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 199, 754 S.W.2d at 849.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 200, 754 S.W.2d at 849-50.
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sesses the requisite competency to waive his right to appeal.
However, the court's failure to provide for mandatory appellate re-
view of at least the sentencing phase of every trial where the death
penalty is imposed leaves the procedure constitutionally suspect.
This question as to the constitutionality of the procedure arises
from the court's failure to apply the proper constitutional analysis to
the issue. By merely reaffirming the Collins"' decision, the court ig-
nored cases decided after the 1976 cases which clarify the require-
ments of a constitutional death penalty procedure and stress the
importance of appellate review to such a scheme. The three tests uti-
lized by the United States Supreme Court when considering death
penalty cases1 35 and the Court's emphasis on appellate review in its
application of these tests 3 6 strongly suggests the necessity of appellate
review. Review by a judicial body separated from the passion and
emotion of the trial court provides one final opportunity to certify
that the sentencing guidelines and procedures established by the legis-
lature are followed. This reduces the chance of arbitrary or capri-
cious results and assures individualized consideration of each case.
More significantly, the court failed to consider the "evolving
standards of decency" analysis. This analysis clearly falls on the side
of mandatory review.' 37 The overwhelming legislative and judicial
embracement of mandatory appellate review as an essential element in
the capital sentencing procedure reflects society's current attitude to-
ward the minimum requirements necessary to assure fair administra-
tion of the sentence. I3 8 This broad acceptance also reflects the interest
of society in seeing that the protections afforded by the eighth amend-
ment are safeguarded. The action of the state in taking the life of one
of its citizens is different from any other state action. The eighth
amendment protects society against improper assertion of this author-
ity. Thus, society maintains an interest in seeing that the state does
not transgress the limits of the amendment.
Likewise, the acceptance of the death penalty by thirty-seven
states reflects society's acceptance of the penalty as a proper means of
promoting a state's criminal policy. However, the court, not the capi-
tal defendant, must determine whether imposition of the penalty in
any given case best promotes the state's interests. Allowing any crim-
inal defendant to select his punishment would encourage, not deter,
134. 261 Ark. 195, 548 S.W.2d 106 (1977).
135. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
138. See supra text accompanying note 20.
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crime. 139 If Ronald Gene Simmons deserves to be executed and if his
execution furthers proper state interests, he should be executed.
However, the decision is not for Mr. Simmons to make.
STANDING 14
Standing refers to the aspect of justiciability that governs the ca-
pacity of a party to prosecute an action or to raise an issue."' Ques-
tions regarding a party's standing commonly arise when the litigation
involves matters of public interest because of the generalized nature of
such issues."' The United States Supreme Court's recent imposition
of rigid standing requirements limits the ability of persons seeking to
litigate such issues from pursuing their claims in a federal forum.
14 3
As a result, state courts assume a more important role in protecting
the fundamental rights represented by these claims. 1"
Federal standing law includes two separate doctrines.145 The
first doctrine emerges from the case and controversy requirement of
Article III of the United States Constitution.'46 This constitutional
limitation restricts Article III courts to cases presented in an adver-
sary context.' 47 Thus, parties seeking standing to invoke the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts must allege a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy. 48 To demonstrate a sufficient personal stake, the
plaintiff must establish that he suffers from an injury or a threatened
injury caused by the challenged action which a favorable decision will
139. See Strafer, supra note 52, at 903-04. "Certainly deterrence is not served by executing
the individual who murdered only because he wished to die but does not have the courage to
do it himself .... To the extent that execution is sought only because the inmate considers it
less painful than life imprisonment, the State's interests in retribution are probably better
served by requiring life imprisonment." Id. at 904. Ronald Gene Simmons testified that he
decided he wanted to die on December 28, 1988, the date on which the Russellville murders
occurred. Brief for Appellant at 4, Franz v. State, 296 Ark. 181, 754 S.W.2d 837 (1988).
140. See supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text for discussion of next friend standing.
141. Kritchevsky, Justiciability in Tennessee, Part Two: Standing, 15 MEM. ST. U.L. REV.
179, 180 (1985).
142. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13, at 60 (4th ed. 1983) (stating that
"[i]t is only where the question is of a public nature that the interested bystander is likely to
attempt suit"). See Merrick, Standing to Sue in Colorado: A State of Disorder, 60 DEN. L.J.
421 n.1 (1983) (stating that "[a]s a practical matter, standing issues arise less frequently when
the suit seeks to challenge private action having limited consequence beyond the parties").
143. Kritchevsky, supra note 141, at 181.
144. Id.
145. Stewart v. Board of County Comm'rs of Big Horn County, 175 Mont. 197, 573 P.2d
184, 186 (1977).
146. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
147. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
148. Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 71 (1984).
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redress. 149 The second doctrine consists of judicially imposed re-
straints aimed at prudent management of judicial review.' 50 This pru-
dential doctrine includes limitations such as prohibitions against a
litigant raising another person's rights and rules barring adjudication
of generalized grievances. 5'
The Supreme Court uses standing limitations to establish the
proper role of federal courts in our system of government. Concern
for the separation of powers doctrine and for principles of federalism
underlie these restraints. 52 Thus, the standing limitations balance the
court's role in the federal system of government by preventing intru-
sion into areas reserved for co-equal branches of government.
1 53
Likewise, the restrictions maintain balance in the relationship that ex-
ists between the federal government and state governments by
preventing federal intrusion into state activities. 54 More importantly,
the limitations maintain balance in the concurrent operation of fed-
eral and state courts by preventing intrusion into the orderly opera-
tion of state judicial processes."'
The autonomous operation of two court systems requires the es-
tablishment of principles and standards to allocate the power exer-
cised by each tribunal. 56 The supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution assures the primacy of federal tribunals.'57 However, by
restraining the exercise of federal judicial authority, the jurisdictional
limitations of Article III and the prudential restraints adopted by the
Supreme Court establish the outer boundaries of federal power.58 On
the other hand, Article III does not address state courts, and state
courts are not bound by the prudential restraints imposed by the
Supreme Court.I59 Thus, state courts may assume jurisdiction in ar-
149. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
(1983).
150. See Nichol, supra note 148, at 71.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 101. See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (describing the basis for
federal court restraint as "a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the
entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the
belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left
free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.").
153. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
154. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112.
155. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974) (stating that "recognition of the need for
a proper balance in the concurrent operation of federal and state courts counsels restraint
156. Nichol, Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 959, 960 (1987).
157. Id. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
158. Nichol, supra note 148, at 101.
159. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 113.
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eas not preempted by federal authority."6 Beginning in the early
1970s, the Supreme Court began imposing rigid barriers which im-
pede access to federal courts. 16' As one justification for these barriers,
the Court emphasized its concern for principles of federalism. 162 This
emphasis on federalism evidenced a return to the relationship that
existed between federal and state courts during the early history of the
country. 163 Prior to the Civil War, the perception that federal intru-
sion into the states' affairs constituted the most serious threat to fun-
damental rights resulted in great federal restraint where matters of
local concern were involved. 164 Under this view, local tribunals pro-
vided the best protection for fundamental rights, so state courts func-
tioned relatively free of federal court interference.
16
After the Civil War, a system of federal oversight gradually
evolved. 166 The struggle against slavery destroyed the perception that
states provided the best protection for fundamental rights. Further-
more, many blamed state court judges for failing to protect these
rights and accused the judges of assisting in efforts to deprive the
freed slaves of their newly acquired rights. 167 Consequently, the states
ratified the Civil War Amendments, 68 and under the authority of
these amendments, Congress granted federal courts authority to as-
sure compliance. Federal courts slowly accepted this authority and
gradually assumed the primary role in the protection of fundamental
rights.' 69 This shift in judicial primacy peaked in the 1960s as the
Warren Court invoked the authority granted under the Civil War
Amendments to implement systematic social reform. 170 However, the
Burger Court halted this expansion of federal authority in the early
1970s by restricting the Court's role in protecting fundamental
rights. 71 The present Court continues to narrowly construe its role in
160. Id.
161. Kritchevsky, supra note 141, at 179-80. These barriers are created by rigorous appli-
cation of the doctrines of standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine.
162. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112. See also O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 499.
163. Comment, Protecting Fundamental Rights in State Courts: Fitting a State Peg to a
Federal Hole, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 64 (1977).
164. Tribe, The Emerging Reconnection of Individual Rights and Institutional Design: Fed-
eralism, Bureaucracy, and Due Process of Lawmaking, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 433, 435
(1977).
165. Nichol, supra note 156, at 960.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 975.
168. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, and XV.
169. Nichol, supra note 156, at 960.




the protection of these rights. 172
As a result of the Supreme Court's retrenchment in the area of
fundamental rights, state courts now provide the only forum for many
litigants. 173 Thus, state courts may expect an increasing number of
persons seeking to litigate matters of public interest. 174 Consequently,
state courts must decide justiciability questions and establish stan-
dards and principles sufficient to accept their renewed importance in
the dual court system. 
17
Traditionally, state courts impose less rigid standing barriers
than federal courts. 176 When deciding standing questions, most state
courts find the prudential restraints of the Supreme Court useful,
1 7 7
but they apply these restraints less rigidly.171 Many states liberally
construe their standing laws and decide issues federal courts would
not adjudicate because the litigant failed to demonstrate a sufficient
personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.1 7 9 Instead of focusing
on the nature of the injury suffered by the litigant, these states focus
more on whether the interest raised deserves protection. 80 Also,
many states provide independent grounds for standing to raise public
interest questions. For example, a vast majority of states recognize
taxpayer status as an independent basis for standing, and some states
allow their courts to issue advisory opinions, thereby eliminating the
need for concern over a litigant's standing. 8 '
The Arkansas Constitution grants taxpayers standing to chal-
lenge "illegal exactions."' 82 Justification for taxpayer standing relies
on the theory that taxpayers are the equitable owners of public funds
and that their liability to replenish funds exhausted by misapplication
entitles them to relief.'83 Therefore, it follows that the term "illegal
172. Kritchevsky, supra note 141, at 180.
173. Id. at 181.
174. Id. See also Merrick, supra note 142, at 421.
175. Nichol, supra note 156, at 960. "It is not only essential that principles be set forth
allocating the powers to be exercised by the constituent judiciaries, but that standards be devel-
oped to determine how each tribunal will deal with the other." Id. at 960.
176. Comment, supra note 163, at 90.
177. Id. See, e.g., Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm'n, 63 Haw. 166, 623 P.2d 431
(1981).
178. Comment, supra note 163, at 90.
179. Id. at 91.
180. See, e.g., Wisconsin Envtl. Decade v. Public Service Comm'n of Wisconsin, 69 Wis. 2d
1, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975).
181. Comment, supra note 163, at 90.
182. ARK. CONST. art. XVI, § 13 provides that "[a]ny citizen of any county, city or town
may institute suit in behalf of himself and all others interested, to protect the inhabitants
thereof against the enforcement of any illegal exactions whatever."
183. Farrell v. Oliver, 146 Ark. 599, 226 S.W. 529 (1921).
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exaction" includes the misapplication of public funds as well as direct
exactions. 184  Furthermore, the remotest effect upon the taxpayer by
any unlawful action of a tax-supported program or institution gives
the taxpayer standing to challenge the action.' 8 5 Consequently, the
Arkansas Supreme Court has upheld the standing of taxpayers to op-
pose unauthorized use of convicts by the corrections department, 186 to
question improper election procedures,' 87 and to challenge the gover-
nor's appointment of a state highway commissioner.
1 88
Aside from the provision allowing taxpayer standing, litigants
seeking standing in Arkansas must demonstrate that they possess a
right which the challenged action infringes. 18 9 The infringed right
and the injury suffered must be personal to the litigant; thus, third
parties may not assert the rights of others. 190 In addition, the court
refuses to address constitutional issues unless resolution is essential to
disposition of the case, 9' and the court refrains from issuing advisory
opinions. 192 Consequently, the litigant must establish the unconstitu-
tionality of the challenged action as directly applied to the litigant.1 93
In Franz v. Stat194 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that Rev.
Franz failed to allege a sufficient relationship with Simmons to confer
next friend standing. 195 The court analogized the case to Davis v. A us-
184. Samples v. Grady, 207 Ark. 724, 182 S.W.2d 875 (1944).
185. Green v. Jones, 164 Ark. 118, 261 S.W. 43 (1924).
186. Id. (challenge to practice of contracting for inmate labor to be used for private uses).
187. Townes v. McCollum, 221 Ark. 920, 256 S.W.2d 716 (1953).
188. White v. Hankins, 276 Ark. 562, 637 S.W.2d 603 (1982).
189. Thompson v. Arkansas Social Services, 282 Ark. 369, 669 S.W.2d 878 (1984).
190. Cox v. Stayton, 273 Ark. 298, 619 S.W.2d 617 (1981). The court cited an exception to
this rule where the issue presented "would not otherwise be susceptible of judicial review and it
appears that the third party is sufficiently interested in the outcome" to assure that the rights
of the other party will be protected. Id. at 302, 619 S.W.2d at 619 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
191. Martin v. State, 79 Ark. 236, 96 S.W. 372 (1906). See Bell v. Bell, 249 Ark. 959, 462
S.W.2d 837 (1971).
192. McCuen v. Harris, 271 Ark. 863, 611 S.W.2d 503 (1981). See Stafford v. City of Hot
Springs, 276 Ark. 466, 637 S.W.2d 553 (1982).
193. Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905
(1973) (defendants accused of sodomy did not have standing to challenge constitutionality of
statute based on its failure to distinguish between acts committed in public and acts committed
in private because the acts committed by the defendants were committed in public); May v.
State, 254 Ark. 194, 492 S.W.2d 888 (1973) (defendant accused of violating statute prohibiting
laymen from performing abortions lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of abortion
statute because the statute was constitutional as applied to him); Sumlin v. State, 266 Ark. 709,
587 S.W.2d 571 (1979) (defendant sentenced to life imprisonment without parole lacked stand-
ing to challenge the death penalty).
194. Franz v. State, 296 Ark. at 184-85, 754 S.W.2d at 841.
195. See supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of next friend standing.
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tin. 19 6 Davis, a Presbyterian minister and director of the Southern
Prison Ministry in Georgia, sought next friend standing to appeal the
conviction of an inmate sentenced to death. The federal court in
Georgia held "that members of the public in general do not have a
right to intercede as 'next friend' . . . because they are morally or
philosophically opposed to the death penalty."'' 97 The Davis court
was concerned that "however worthy and highminded the motives of
'next friends' may be, they inevitably run the risk of making the actual
defendant a pawn to be manipulated on a chess board larger than his
own case."'
198
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that Rev. Franz's connection
to Simmons was even more tenuous than that which existed in Da-
vis. 199 In Davis, the petitioner alleged personal contact with the de-
fendant, and she alleged that she occasionally counseled the
defendant. However, the Arkansas court held that this relationship
was insufficient to confer next friend standing.2 °' The Arkansas
Supreme Court observed that the petition filed by Franz failed to "in-
dicate that he is Simmons' minister, spiritual advisor, or confidant, or
even less, that the two have ever met."
20 '
The court denied Franz taxpayer standing for two reasons. First,
the court held that "a suit to prevent an illegal exaction must be com-
menced in a trial court. '20 2 Second, the court declared that the con-
stitutional grant of taxpayer standing is "not so broad that it gives one
taxpayer the right to intervene in the merits of a criminal case against
another person. ' 20 3 The court did not provide support for either
conclusion.
The court also declared that the existence of unresolved constitu-
tional questions is not sufficient to give a third person standing. °'
The court cited Gilmore v. Utah 205 to support this holding. The Gil-
more Court noted that Utah's death penalty statute was constitution-
ally suspect.20 6 Since Gilmore's mother lacked standing and Gilmore
refused to appeal his sentence, there was no party before the Court
196. 492 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
197. Id. at 275.
198. Id. at 276.





204. Id. at 186, 754 S.W.2d at 842.
205. 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
206. Id. at 1017.
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with standing to challenge the statute.2 °7 Thus, the constitutional
question remained unresolved.208
The court's decision sends a distorted message to persons seeking
to litigate matters of public interest in Arkansas. On one hand, the
limitations which the court imposes on taxpayer standing2°9 reflect a
narrowing attitude toward public interest litigation. Under the
court's previous interpretations of taxpayer standing,210 the court
could easily have justified granting Rev. Franz standing to raise the
mandatory appeal issue, for, if the constitution grants taxpayers
standing to challenge even the remotest expenditure, the provision ar-
guably grants a taxpayer standing to challenge the expenditure of
public funds to carry out an allegedly illegal execution.
On the other hand, by proceeding to resolve the issue after hold-
ing that Rev. Franz lacked standing, the court appears to adopt the
attitude of state courts which look more at the importance of the in-
terest raised than at the party raising the issue.21 1 Contrary to the
court's long standing rule not to address constitutional questions un-
less necessary for resolution of a controversy, 21 2 the court's resolution
of the mandatory appeal issue amounts to an advisory opinion. Thus,
the decision may indicate a liberalization of the court's attitude to-
ward advisory opinions and public interest litigation in general.
More significantly, if the court continues to adhere to the ration-
ale underlying federal court decisions, litigants seeking to litigate mat-
ters of public interest will lack a forum in Arkansas. By relying on
federal precedent to determine whether a party has standing in Ar-
kansas courts, the Arkansas Supreme Court limits itself to the same
constitutional and prudential restraints that limit the jurisdiction of
federal courts. This approach by a state court thwarts the federalistic
goal of the United States Supreme Court to limit federal intrusion into
the autonomy of state courts. 21 3 For such a model of federalism to
succeed in defining the respective role of each court in the dual court
system, state courts must move to fill the void left by federal court
restraint. To do so, state courts must affirmatively accept their role in
the protection of fundamental rights. If the state requirements simply
mirror the federal requirements, litigants barred from federal forums
207. Id.
208. Franz v. State, 296 Ark. at 186, 754 S.W.2d at 842.
209. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
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due to federal deference to state courts will be totally without a forum
to protect their rights in Arkansas.
Because of the United States Supreme Court's retrenchment in
the protection of fundamental rights, the Arkansas Supreme Court
can expect an increase in litigants seeking to prosecute matters of pub-
lic interest. The court must clarify its position and establish its own
prudential standards for management of judicial review. Further-
more, these standards must be fashioned so that the court can assume
its proper role in the dual system of courts. Until the court clarifies
its position, it can expect to be faced with litigants hoping that the
court will decide their case on its merits whether they are granted
standing or not, as did the Franz court.
Michael White
